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Teaching the Torture Memos: 
“Making Decisions under 
Conditions of Uncertainty”1
Clare Keefe Coleman
Whether we like it or not schooling is a moral enterprise. Values issues abound 
in the content and process of teaching.2
I. Introduction
Eleven years ago, on September 11, 2001, attorney John Yoo turned on the 
television in his office and saw a hijacked plane hit the South Tower of the 
World Trade Center in lower Manhattan.3 At the time of the attacks, Yoo was 
a newly appointed deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal 
1. William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith W. Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman, 
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 22 (Jossey-Bass 2007) [hereinafter 
The Carnegie Report].
2. Lawrence Kohlberg & Richard H. Hersh, Moral Development: A Review of the Theory, 16 
Theory Into Practice, Apr. 1977, at 53, 53.
3. John Yoo, War By Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror 1 (Atlantic 
Monthly Press 2006) [hereinafter Yoo, War By Other Means]. John Yoo witnessed the 
second strike; approximately eighteen minutes earlier, hijackers had struck the North 
Tower of the World Trade Center. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 7 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report], 
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. Later that morning, a 
third airliner smashed into the Pentagon and a fourth crashed in a field in southwestern 
Pennsylvania. Id. at 8. Approximately 3,000 people died in those four crashes, including 
the nineteen hijackers who came from “various groups of Islamist extremists” “driven by” 
Osama bin Laden. Executive Summary, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2–3, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. 
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Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice.4 Yoo writes that in the hours after 
the 9/11 attacks, as much of “official Washington” evacuated, he and a “skeletal 
staff” of the OLC stayed behind and were asked to make a judgment—whether 
the United States was at war.5
Although most lawyers are never asked to make judgments of such public 
magnitude, lawyers make judgments every day, and the Carnegie Report asks 
law schools to teach students how to make them.6 To learn this skill, the report 
says, students should be schooled in the law, the rules of professional ethics 
and “the wider matters of morality and character.”7
Current discussions among legal scholars about teaching moral judgment 
making fall into three categories: The first, championed by David Luban, 
among others, recommends teaching judgment only in the clinical context.8 
Luban’s model is based on Aristotelian virtue ethics, which instructs students 
to learn to make judgments through experience and critical reflection. As this 
article discusses, however, current education theory shows that experiential 
education is not the best or only way for adult students to learn. In fact, 
some adult students learn better from abstract conceptualizing or reflective 
observation, first, rather than immersion into practice.9
The second category of discussion about teaching moral judgment is 
articulated by W. Bradley Wendel, who recommends teaching judgment from 
a social and legal normative approach. Wendel’s normative approach posits 
that lawyers’ role as agents to their clients should prevent lawyers from making 
4. John Yoo was “the number two” person at the OLC. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: 
Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 21 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2007).
5. Yoo, War By Other Means, supra note 3, at 1–10. They concluded that it was. Id. at 4. This 
judgment led to Yoo’s authoring many of the OLC’s legal memoranda on aspects of the 
Bush administration’s war on terrorism including the two memos that relate to the use of ten 
physically painful techniques on an alleged al Qaeda operative during interrogation, which 
are discussed in Section III.B. See infra notes 115–128 and accompanying text. 
6. As the Carnegie Report notes, skillful practice in the professions “means involvement in 
situations that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowledge. 
Professional practice, that is, depends on judgment to yield an outcome that can further 
the profession’s intended purposes.” The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 8; see also Nathan 
M. Crystal, Using the Concept of “A Philosophy of Lawyering” in Teaching Professional 
Responsibility, 51 St. Louis. U. L. J. 1235, 1240 (2007) (noting the “wide range of discretionary 
decisions” that lawyers will face in their practice); W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in 
Legal Ethics, 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 113, 117 (2000) (lawyers sometimes need to resort to their 
“personal ethical identity” in making judgments); David Luban & Michael Millemann, 
Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 31 (1995) (“It is 
a commonplace that good judgment is the most valuable thing a lawyer has to offer clients—
more valuable than legal learning or skillful analysis of doctrine.”).
7. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 129. 
8. See, e.g., Luban & Milleman, supra note 6. 
9. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
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moral judgments that are based on non-legal principles.10 As this article notes, 
however, teaching morality from an approach that embraces pre-determined 
rules and standards11 leaves the student ill-prepared to address conditions of 
uncertainty that may call for judgment beyond the law and ethics rules.12
Finally, critics such as Cass Sunstein question the value of teaching students 
systems or techniques of addressing moral questions at all, suggesting that in 
areas of moral judgment making, such heuristics can lead to moral errors.13 To 
this, the article notes current studies that show that, even if law students do 
not receive formal instruction in metaphysics, young adults learn about moral 
practice by what they observe in the classroom.14 Given this, the article suggests, 
the Carnegie Report’s conclusion that law students receive instruction in “the 
wider matters of morality and character”15 appears well-founded.
Against this conclusion, this article offers a new way to instruct law students 
in moral judgment making. It suggests incorporating into the first-semester 
legal writing course the Torture Memos—two predictive legal memoranda, 
known as Bybee I16 and Bybee II,17 which were written by John Yoo and 
signed by his boss at OLC, Jay S. Bybee.18 In particular, this article suggests 
10. W. Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 
1071, 1073 (2007) [hereinafter Wendel, Moral Judgment]; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Ethics 
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67 (2006) [hereinafter Wendel, 
Separation of Law and Morals]. 
11. See William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. Ill L. Rev. 545, 546 (1994) (defining 
norms as “rules and standards that impose limits on acceptable behavior”).
12. See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 Behav. & Brain Sci. 531, 532 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 
88 Minn. L. Rev. 1556, 1558 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Moral Framing]. 
14. See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
15. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 129. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and 
John C. Yoo to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Possible 
Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Dec. 28, 2001, available 
in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), at 29 
[hereinafter The Torture Papers].
16. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340–2340A, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Bybee I].
17. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, for John Rizzo Acting 
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, 
available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf [hereinafter Bybee II].
18. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 142 (the two memos were “drafted by” Yoo); see also Report, 
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating 
to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on 
Suspected Terrorists, Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, July 29, 
2009, at 20 [hereinafter OPR Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. (Yoo was the “primary author” of the two memos.).
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introducing the memos as one model of legal writing,19 and then using them 
to consider the underlying moral judgment making inherent in the memos. To 
frame the moral discussion, the article uses an approach based on the work of 
philosopher Susan Neiman in which discussions of moral judgment start with 
tools familiar to law students—reason and sincerity—and then are analyzed 
with a four-step process that fits the framework.20
To offer the Torture Memos as a model for teaching law students how to 
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the article proceeds in the 
following way: Part II discusses the current conclusions in legal education 
scholarship about the role of morality in professional judgment making and 
the role of law schools in teaching morality. The article shows that current 
thinking in legal pedagogy about the development of moral identity in law 
students falls squarely within the conclusions of psychologists.21 The article 
then discusses some approaches to teaching judgment making,22 drawing on 
current thinkers such as Luban,23 Wendel,24 and Sunstein, as well as traditional 
philosophical and contemporary neuroscientific definitions of “reason,” both 
of which conclude that reason is formed by both emotion and logic.25
In Part III, the article describes Neiman’s reason-based approach to moral 
judgment making, distinguishing it from those approaches discussed in Part 
II. Then, after briefly describing the context and background of the Torture 
19. As real-life samples of legal memoranda, the Torture Memos employ many aspects of 
predictive legal memoranda that legal methods instructors attempt to instill in their first-year 
students. For example, they follow standard format (variously known by acronyms such as 
IRAC and CREAC); and they draw analogies and distinctions to existing case law. Equally 
as instructive, however, is that the memos fail in the same way as much beginning law 
student writing: they misstate important case law, lack analytical depth, and fail to develop 
a counterargument. See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J. Natl’l Sec. L & Pol. 455, 458–463 (2005) (listing substantive inaccuracies 
in Bybee I); see also Linda Berger, Comments, Scholarship, 61 Mercer L. Rev. 803, 808 
(2010) (advocating that instructors of legal writing focus on legal rhetoric as a source of 
academic scholarship and suggesting that analyzing Bybee I would be a source for such 
analysis). Other instructors of legal writing have incorporated ethical or moral problems in 
their first-year writing classes. See, e.g., Philip M. Frost, Using Ethical Problems in First-Year 
Skills Courses, 14 Perspectives: Teaching Legal Res. & Writing 7 (2005) (describing a first-
semester, first-year assignment brief on a motion to disqualify a law firm from representing 
a party in a lawsuit and noting, “[o]ne advantage [to the assignment] is that it involves an 
interesting combination of rules, ethical principles, and the realities of practice”).
20. Susan Neiman, Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists (Harcourt 2008) [hereinafter 
Neiman]; see infra notes 84–113 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 37–52 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 55–83 and accompanying text. It is not this article’s purpose to do a 
comprehensive review of various moral heuristics and offer a critique of each. Rather, I 
attempt to offer a framework to test moral heuristics and propose Neiman’s approach as one 
that withstands that test.
23. See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 67–76 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
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Memos, the article shows how Neiman’s approach can be used to frame a 
discussion about moral judgment making in a first-year legal writing class.
In its conclusion, the article suggests that instructors—in introducing 
concepts of moral philosophy to be used with law and ethics rules to make 
decisions—ultimately should encourage their students to develop their own 
moral judgment making criteria, insisting only that they comport with the 
other pedagogical lesson of law school: that the criteria should be able to 
withstand reason-based assault.
II. A Role for Law Schools in Teaching Moral Judgment: 
Directives and Theory
Because so much of legal practice involves making judgments, current legal 
education scholarship recommends that law schools introduce students to 
moral judgment making. In discussing this role of law schools, this section 
reviews current recommendations about teaching morality and discusses 
how the recommendations comport with the conclusions of philosophers, 
psychologists and legal ethicists about teaching moral judgment.
A. Current Legal Education Directives: 
Professional Judgment and Individual Morality
The Carnegie Report identifies six common tasks of professional education, 
the third of which is “enabling students to learn to make judgments under 
conditions of uncertainty.”26 To make judgments, the report continues, 
students need to be schooled in the law, in legal ethics and in “the wider 
26. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 22. Sullivan and his coauthors identified a “common 
goal” of the professional educations found in seminaries and in schools of medicine, nursing, 
engineering and law: “Professional education aims to initiate novice practitioners to think, to 
perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals.” 
Id. Toward those goals of “knowledge, skills and attitude,” professional education involves 
six tasks: 
 1. Developing in students the fundamental knowledge and skill, especially an academic 
knowledge base and research.
 2. Providing students with the capacity to engage in complex practice.
 3. Enabling students to learn to make judgments under conditions of uncertainty.
 4. Teaching students how to learn from experience.
 5. Introducing students to the disciplines of creating and participating in a responsible 
and effective professional community.
 6. Forming students able and willing to join an enterprise of public service.
 Id.
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matters of morality and character,”27 which would instruct lawyers how to use 
and apply the laws and ethics rules in their practice.28
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
similarly acknowledge that lawyers need to make moral judgments.29 In its 
preamble, for example, the rules note that professional ethics rules do not 
anticipate all the judgments practicing attorneys must make: “[M]any difficult 
issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through 
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment.”30 Similarly, the 
27. Id. at 129. Other commentators have also discussed the need for a “moral pedagogy” 
in law schools. See, e.g., Maksymilian Del Mar, At the Lectern: Moral Education in Law 
Schools and Law Firms, 59 J. Legal Educ. 298, 299 (2009) (discussing a series of exercises 
designed by artists and educators in which law professors, practitioners and doctoral 
students participated and noting that the participants “discussed the limitations of text-
based teaching in legal education and the need for a more deliberate moral pedagogy in 
law schools (one that goes beyond reproducing the professional environment, as in clinical 
legal education);” Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 
Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1994). Some writers have noted that law schools lag behind other 
professional schools in incorporating the teaching of judgment making into the curriculum. 
See, e.g., Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: 
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into the Clinical Setting, 11 
Clinical L. Rev. 15, 19 (2004). Other writers note the “number of approaches” used in the 
professional responsibility literature to assist lawyers in making discretionary decisions. 
Crystal, supra note 6, at 1241.
28. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 30–31. Other writers on professional development 
advocate educating students to make moral choices. See, e.g., Donald A. Schon, Educating the 
Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions 
xiii (Jossey-Bass 1990) (“[E]ducation for reflective practice, though not a sufficient condition 
for wise or moral practice, is certainly a necessary one. For how are practitioners to learn 
wisdom except by reflection on practiced dilemmas that call for it?”); see also Christina 
Harrison, A Crisis in Ethics, The National Jurist, Oct. 2009, at 16 (discussing certain law 
schools that are “bringing morality into the classroom” in the face of the 2009 worldwide 
financial crisis, one cause of which was “questionable moral decisions made by those 
involved”); Burton, supra note 27; Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning 
About Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 247, 262 (1998) (“[W]e need to 
alert students to a variety of factors and considerations, some information-based and some 
value-based, that affect legal problem solving.”).
29. The Pennsylvania Rules contain the same language as the Model Rules, and John Yoo 
is an active member of the Pennsylvania bar. See http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/
pa_attorney_info.php?id=69500&pdcount=0. Yoo’s Pennsylvania attorney identification 
number is 69500; he was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar on December 3, 1993. See id. One 
writer notes, however, that, under the McDade Amendment, Yoo is subject to the ethics 
rules of the District of Columbia because he practiced there when he worked for OLC. 
Clark, supra note 19, at 464. Similarly, the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) concluded that under the Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the 
Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2003), the District of Columbia Rules applied. OPR Report, 
supra note 18, at 20.
30. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, pmbl. ¶ 9. Notwithstanding this language, David Luban 
and Michael Millemann argue that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have rejected 
the language of morality found in the earlier versions of the guides to professional ethics in 
favor of the “more technical-sounding ‘professional responsibility.’” Luban & Millemann, 
supra note 6 at 45; see also Deborah J. Cantrell, Teaching Practical Wisdom, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 
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ABA’s Commission on Professionalism emphasizes that among the “essential 
characteristics” of the “professional lawyer” is “practical wisdom,” which 
contains elements of the “capacity for self-scrutiny and for moral dialogue 
with clients and other individuals involved in the justice system.”31 And Roy 
Stuckey and others encourage law schools to teach students “how to resolve 
human problems and to cultivate practical wisdom.”32
In drawing the conclusion that judgment making has a moral component 
beyond that found in the law and professional ethics rules, the authors of the 
Carnegie Report and other writers on legal pedagogy follow a long line of 
philosophers who acknowledge that pre-set laws and rules cannot determine 
all situations. Kant, for example, talks about judgments as occupying a space 
beyond laws and rules and says that judgment is needed to determine which 
rule applies.33 Aristotle defines judgment, or practical wisdom, as “acting 
rationally in matters good and bad.”34 More recently David Luban and Michael 
Millemann similarly noted:
391, 407–08 (2003) (noting that in the clinical context the de-moralized rules may limit 
students’ analysis to one of technical compliance rather than encouraging them to ask 
broader questions about morality). However, at least one commentator believes “common 
moral norms” are “reflected in the rules of professional conduct just as other aspects of the 
‘law of lawyering’ are strongly rooted in common morality.” Bruce A. Green, The Role of 
Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 19, 22–23 (1997) 
(citations omitted). Professor Green acknowledges, however, that individual moral codes 
may conflict with professional norms. Id.
31. Professionalism Committee, Amer. Bar Ass’n Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions to Bar, 
Teaching and Learning Professionalism 6–7 (1996) [hereinafter ABA, Teaching and Learning 
Professionalism].
32. Roy Stuckey and Others, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Roadmap 141 
(Clinical Legal Educ. Assoc. 2007). Despite this encouragement from the Carnegie Report 
and the like, some writers have noted that law schools lag behind other professional schools 
in incorporating the teaching of judgment making into the curriculum. See, e.g., Burton, supra 
note 27, at 19; but see Crystal, supra note 6, at 1241 (2007) (noting the “number of approaches” 
used in the professional responsibility literature to assist lawyers in making discretionary 
decisions).
33. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 155 (trans. J.M. D. Meiklejohn 1900) (1787) (“If 
understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the faculty of judgment 
may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these rules; that is, of distinguishing 
whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis). General 
logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgment, nor can it contain any 
such.”) (italics omitted). As Hannah Arendt observed in discussing Adolf Eichmann’s 
bastardization of Kant’s categorical imperative, “Kant’s moral philosophy is so closely 
bound up with man’s [sic] faculty of judgment.” Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
A Report on the Banality of Evil 136 (Penguin 1964); see also David Luban, Epistemology 
and Moral Education, 33 J. Legal Educ. 636, 639 (1983) (hereinafter Luban, Epistemology) 
(“judgment cannot be taught in the form of rules”). Luban, however, finds flaws in Kant as a 
model for moral education, and prefers Aristotle. Id.; see infra notes 56–66 and accompanying 
text.
34. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6. 5(c). 1140b4-5. (Martin Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts 
Press, Inc. 1962) [hereinafter Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics]; see also Cantrell, supra note 30. 
Practical wisdom, Cantrell writes, has its roots in Aristotle and is woven into the works of 
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[M]oral decision making requires more than identifying the appropriate 
principles and values, and it requires more than analyzing argument. Being 
smart has little to do with [moral decision making]. Rather, moral decision 
making involves identifying which principle is more important given the 
particularities of the situation, and this capacity is precisely what we mean by 
judgment.35
These disparate sources agree that judgment making is informed by, among 
other things, an individual’s moral sense. Professional judgment is, as Luban 
elegantly defines, the “intellectual capacity involved in moral matters.”36
 B. Psychologists—Morality as a Human Need
The conclusions of those professional committees and organizations—
that individual morality informs professional judgments—reflect findings 
of psychologists that morality is fundamental to the human mind and thus 
essential to humans. Because morality is essential, attempts to curtail moral 
discussions in law school classes, or to limit them to ethics or clinical courses,37 
are likely to be futile and, more importantly, are likely to leave untouched an 
important area of legal education.
In his classic study on human motivation, psychologist Abraham Maslow 
notes that humans are driven by moral needs so strong that these needs may be 
“preconditions” to satisfying the “basic need” of food.38 Maslow emphasizes 
humans’ moral needs for “freedom to speak, freedom to do what one wishes 
so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express one’s self, freedom 
to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend one’s self, justice, 
fairness, honesty [and] orderliness in the group” as examples of “preconditions” 
to the basic needs for food and the like.39 Similarly, scientists who study 
human behavior suggest that early forms of morality were part of the human 
Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Llewellyn. Id. n.1. She defines practical wisdom 
as “the ability to consider the circumstances of a particular situation with empathy and 
compassion for competing viewpoints, without untempered partisanship, and with concern 
for questions of ethics and morality.” Id. at 392.
35. Luban & Millemann, supra note 6, at 39.
36. Luban, Epistemology, supra note 33, at 654; see also Aaronson, supra note 28 (“The extent 
to which individuals are likely to have good judgment depends on their cognitive and 
moral development.”); Michael Schleifer, Moral Education and Indoctrination, 86 Ethics 
154, 158 (1976) (“There is in mathematical education or moral education (which is like the 
mathematical), a process in which the learner must come to see things for himself. The 
teaching of principles (whether of mathematics or of equality and justice) can never simply 
be the imparting of a certain amount of content.”).
37. See ABA, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, supra note 31, at 14–15 (criticizing law 
schools for restricting instruction on issues of legal ethics and professional responsibility to 
a single, one-semester course in legal ethics).
38. A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 Psychol. Review 370, 383 (1943), available 
at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm.
39. Id.; see also Neiman, supra note 20, at 4 (humans have “moral needs” that are sometimes “so 
strong they can override our instincts for self-preservation”).
89
mind from as long ago as seven million years ago.40 Recent developments in 
neuroscience research also suggest that human moral sense is present even in 
the first year of life.41
In discussing morality and moral development in humans, legal scholars 
such as Neil Duxbury and Cass Sunstein have drawn on the work of 
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg,42 who theorized that an individual’s 
moral reasoning develops in stages.43 In Kohlberg’s view, at early stages of 
moral development, which he called “pre-conventional” or Stages 1 and 2, 
concepts of right and wrong are framed in terms of punishment, reward and 
self-interest. In the middle, or “conventional,” level, Stages 3 and 4, moral 
development focuses on conformity to expectations and social norms and to 
obeying rules. At the highest levels, Stages 5 and 6, moral reasoning is based 
on abstract and universal principles, such as justice and equal rights.44 Thus, 
according to Kohlberg, at the highest level of moral development individuals 
make judgments that permit them to question laws and rules of society, rather 
40. Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, Science, May 18, 2007, at 998 
[hereinafter Haidt, The New Synthesis]; Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and 
Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 Trends Cognitive Sci. 517, 517 (2002) [hereinafter 
Greene & Haidt].
41. See, e.g., Paul Bloom, The Moral Life of Babies, N.Y. Times Magazine, May 9, 2010, at 46 
(“With the help of well-designed experiments, you can see glimmers of moral thought, 
moral judgment and moral feeling even in the first year of life.”); see also Neiman, supra note 
20, at 420 (“We are born with a sense of justice the world does not meet.”); c.f. Sunstein, 
Moral Heuristics, supra note 13, at 534 (acknowledging research that some moral heuristics 
“might well have an evolutionary foundation”).
42. Kohlberg, a psychologist who studied Jean Piaget’s cognitive approach to psychology, 
theorized that individuals determine right and wrong, not society. James R. Rest, 
Background: Theory and Research, in Moral Development in the Professions (James R. 
Rest & Darcia Narváez eds., Psychology Press 1994). Kohlberg claimed that humans used 
six problem-solving strategies, which he phrased in terms of their moral development. Id.; 
see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337 (1997). See generally Lawrence 
Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (Harper & Row 1981) and Lawrence 
Kohlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development (Harper Collins Coll. Div. 1994).
43. Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and the Law, 84 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1529, 1540 n.36 (2009) (referring to Kohlberg’s work on early stage moral development 
in children); Cass Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 
405, 405 n.1 (2009) [hereinafter Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law] 
(ascribing to Kohlberg a conception of morality as a “system of abstract rules”); see also Alan 
M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach Us 
About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices, 23 
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 643, 666 (2004) .
44. Lawrence Kohlberg & Richard H. Hersh, Moral Development: A Review of the Theory, 
16 Theory Into Practice, Apr. 1977, at 53, 54–55. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development as 
emanating from the individual rejected the then-predominant view that society determines 
right and wrong. Rest, supra note 42, at 2. Instead, Kohlberg theorized that the individual 
determines what is right and wrong, and he encouraged psychologists to focus their research 
on how individuals arrive at moral judgments. Id. 
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than simply following imposed rules.45 To reach these high levels of “moral 
knowledge and moral judgment,” Kohlberg found, requires “a process of 
reasoning and reflection.”46
As a group, law students have not reached the highest level of moral 
development. In fact, as Susan Daicoff has noted, researchers employing 
Kohlberg’s stages classify law students at Stages 4 to early Stage 5, on par 
with the general population and other professionals.47 Researchers using non-
Kohlberg methods have similarly found that law student morality was “more 
conventional” and “focused on maintaining social order and conformity,”48 
consistent with Kohlberg’s Stage 4. Traditional legal education, Daicoff 
found, tends to have little or a slightly deleterious effect on law students’ 
moral development and moral decision making.49
But education designed to teach moral judgment making can be successful 
for law school-aged students. In a review of fifty-five studies of education 
interventions “designed to stimulate development in moral judgment,” 
researchers found that such programs had “significant effects.”50
 Even skeptics, such as psychologist Jonathan Haidt, agree that there is 
enough evidence that moral reasoning can be honed and that it does affect 
45. Kohlberg & Hersh, supra note 44, at 55. Similarly, Luban and Millemann emphasize, at times 
“individual conscience must take the place of traditional norms.” Luban & Millemann, supra 
note 6, at 36 (citing Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times 11 (Harcourt 1968)); see also Luban, 
Epistemology, supra note 33, at 639 (“[W]e must admit that at some point, we move beyond 
rule application to some non-rule-governed activity of judgment.” (italics in the original)). 
46. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, Emotional Dog] (citing, 
among others, Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (D.A. 
Goslin ed., Rand McNally 1969). In Emotional Dog, Haidt defines (and disagrees with) 
Kohlberg’s rationalist model, in which “moral emotions such as sympathy may sometimes 
be inputs to the reasoning process, but moral emotions are not the direct causes of moral 
judgments. In rationalist models, one briefly becomes a judge, weighing issues of harm, 
rights, justice and fairness, before passing judgment.” Id. Haidt argues that humans’ moral 
judgments are a product of “intuition.” Id. at 814. 
47. Daicoff, supra note 42, at 1396–97 (citations omitted) (1997). Kohlberg’s Stage 4 is the “law 
and order orientation.” Kohlberg & Hersh, supra note 44, at 55. At Stage 4, “[t]here is 
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right 
behavior consists of doing one’s duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the 
given social order for its own sake.” Id. At Stage 5, there is a “social-contract, legalistic 
orientation, general with utilitarian overtones . . . . The result is an emphasis on the ‘legal 
point of view.’” Id.
48. Daicoff, supra note 42, at 1397 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. See Andre Schlaefli, James R. Rest & Stephen J. Thoma, Does Moral Education Improve 
Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analysis of Intervention Studies Using the Defining Issues Test, 
55 Rev. Educ. Res. 319 (1985).
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practice choices to warrant teaching it from a reason-based approach.51 As 
Mark Neal Aaronson writes: “In any particular set of circumstances, exercises 
in judgment presume a mastery of certain relevant knowledge . . . . Judgment 
is not the same thing as intuition.”52
C. Current Approaches to Teaching Moral Judgment to Law Students: 
Luban, Wendel, and Sunstein
Given the directives that law schools introduce judgment making into the 
curriculum53 and the conclusions of scientists that moral judgment making 
can be taught, or at least honed, in law school-aged students,54 this article 
addresses some approaches to teaching moral judgment making. Theories of 
teaching morality date back at least to Socrates in his dialogue with Meno,55 
but this article limits its discussion to three contemporary approaches.
1. The Aristotelian-Influenced Clinical Approach 
to Teaching Judgment Making
Some leading legal ethicists suggest that morality, as a component of 
judgment, can “only” be learned through applied or clinical work, or in, at 
most, a course that combines clinical practice with in-class instruction on 
ethics and morals.56 In describing a “hybrid clinical-classroom method of 
ethics teaching,” David Luban and Michael Millemann assert: “[T]he best 
way to teach legal ethics—the only way to teach legal ethics that incorporates 
the all-important element of moral judgment—is clinically.”57
In championing clinical experiences to teach moral judgment, Luban 
and Millemann “defend the Aristotelian idea that judgment is cultivated 
through immersion in practice combined with critical reflection on practical 
51. “Moral reasoning can correct and override moral intuition.” Jonathan Haidt, The New 
Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 Science 998, 1001 (2007).
52. Aaronson, supra note 28, at 264. 
53. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
55. “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither 
by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man [sic] by nature, or in what other 
way?” Plato, Meno, in Five Great Dialogues of Plato 57 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Coyote 
Canyon Press 2009) (380 BCE). 
56. See, e.g., Luban & Millemann, supra note 6, at 32. 
57. Id. at 40 (emphasis in the original); see also Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 
Mercer L. Rev. 659 (2009) (describing one law school’s efforts to teach “professionalism” 
through two classes: a first-year classroom course and a third-year course that combines 
lecture, small-group discussion and student reflection; Cantrell, supra note 30 (discussing the 
Lawyering Ethics Clinic at Yale Law School and considering whether the clinic was effective 
in teaching students “practical wisdom.”); Aaronson, supra note 28 (describing approaches 
used to encourage students to develop “good lawyering judgment” in the context of a civil 
justice clinic).
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experiences.”58 This idea of learning from experience with opportunity 
for reflection also has a sound basis in contemporary adult learning theory. 
“Experiential learning,” as distinguished from cognitive and behavioral 
learning, is the process of creating knowledge through the transformation 
of experience and it is a successful way for some learners to perceive new 
information.59
 However, experiential learning is not the only way for law students 
to learn.60 Education scholars note that some adult students learn new 
information through “abstract conceptualization—thinking about, analyzing, 
or systematically planning” rather than using experience as a guide.61 Still 
other adult learners are “watchers” who favor “reflective observation.”62 The 
latter students learn by “carefully watch[ing] others who are involved in the 
experience and reflect[ing] on what happens.”63 Both types of learners—abstract 
conceptualizers and watchers—would be unlikely to learn moral judgment 
making best in a clinical context. Instead, these learners may do better by 
being exposed to moral philosophy in the classroom, discussing situations in 
which moral judgment is needed and reflecting on choices others made.64
Aside from considerations of students’ learning aptitudes, few law professors 
have the luxury of interpolating into their classrooms a clinic in which students 
can practice the substance of the law or skills being taught while confronting 
and reflecting on the ethical and moral judgment lessons such a clinic might 
58. Luban & Millemann, supra note 6, at 32; see also Luban, Epistemology, supra note 33, at 637, 
648 (calling Aristotle’s Ethics “the greatest work of moral psychology ever composed,” and 
championing virtue ethics as the framework for “clinical moral education”).
59. See David A. Kolb, Richard E. Boyatzis & Charalampos Mainemelis, Experiential Learning 
Theory: Previous Research and New Directions in Perspectives on Cognitive, Learning, and 
Thinking Styles (Robert J. Sternberg & Li-Fang Zhang eds., Routledge 2001).
60. Nathan Crystal believes that clinical courses have “severe limitations” in teaching judgment. 
Crystal, supra note 6, at 1247. His criticisms note that fewer students participate in clinical 
experiences and that clinical experiences themselves are limited such that the “issues of 
professional judgment” to which the students are exposed are limited in number.” Id. at 
1247. Thus, Crystal recommends that “traditional courses on professional responsibility find 
ways of incorporating development of professional judgment into their fabric.” Id. (Crystal’s 
suggestions include: student papers, problem-based methods, case-based method, teacher 
demonstrations and panel discussions.).
61. Kolb et al., supra note 59. As psychologist Diana Pritchard Paolitto notes, “A cognitive 
development framework of teaching not only recognizes the potential learning that can 
result from philosophical inquiry in the classroom, but this approach also encourages an 
open-ended dialogue about crucial moral questions.” Diana Pritchard Paolitto, The Role of 
the Teacher in Moral Education, 16 Theory Into Prac. 73, 73 (1977).
62. Kolb et al., supra note 59, at 4. 
63. Id. at 3–4.
64. David Luban acknowledges “[E]ven in the classroom more is going on than meets the 
ear. Judgment (of a sort) is being cultivated as well as rules being formulated.” Luban, 
Epistemology, supra note 33, at 640. 
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present.65 Therefore, given the realities of the different ways students learn and 
the way the law is taught, limiting the teaching of moral judgment to clinical 
courses seems short-sighted at best. At worst it may bracket moral questions, 
perhaps allowing non-clinical law instructors to assume that it is not their role 
to teach moral judgment making.66
2. The Norms Approach to Teaching Judgment Making
Some other legal scholars are doubtful that morality should be taught—in 
clinical courses or at all. These scholars suggest that legal judgment should 
simply be the application of legal norms, “which may incorporate moral 
principles . . . but which are analytically distinct from morality.”67 W. Bradley 
Wendel, for example, suggests that lawyers are presumptuous to think 
65. Similarly, to the extent professionalism was traditionally learned through apprenticeships, 
Patrick Longan notes that the profession’s “willingness or ability to provide [instruction 
in professionalism through apprenticeships] has waned.” Longan, supra note 57, at 660–
61. Longan suggests that financial pressures on law firms make mentoring too expensive 
and lawyers who were not mentored tend not to mentor younger attorneys. Id. at 661. He 
concludes that the legal profession has turned to law schools to provide professionalism 
training. Id.
66. See ABA, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, supra note 31, at 14 (“Although there has 
been a great deal written about the pervasive method of teaching legal ethics throughout 
the entire curriculum, law schools have, for the most part, merely given lip service to this 
approach.”).
67. Wendel, Moral Judgment, supra note 10, at 1071. Wendel disagrees with the views of those 
legal ethicists who suggest that lawyers, when acting as representatives of their clients, have 
a personal, moral responsibility for their actions. Id. at 1072. He also disagrees with the view 
that law schools have responsibility for “improving the ethical decision-making capacities 
of students.” Id. Arguing from principles of agency law and his view of the role of lawyers 
in society, Wendell states, “I believe lawyers in fact should refrain from exercising moral 
judgment on the basis of non-legal values.” Id. at 1072; see also Richard Painter, Tell Me No 
Lies, 32 Am. Law., Jun. 1, 2010, available at Factiva, Document ALAW000020100603e6610000z 
(advocating honesty rather than a don’t ask, don’t tell policy on homosexuals in the military, 
Painter opines, “[Q]uestions of morality are a matter for theologians and religious leaders 
to debate.”). Nathan Crystal similarly describes a philosophy that is based on social or 
professional values or norms as a “philosophy of institutional values.” Crystal, supra note 
6, at 1242. An advantage to this philosophy, he writes, is that norms expressed in “an 
institutional form” are “likely to be seen as more objective and justified than moral values, 
which are often viewed as individual, subjective, and controversial); see also Cantrell, supra 
note 30, at 393 (suggesting that the term “practical wisdom” may seem to not need much 
definition: “The phrase suggests a kind of applied intelligence with an additional normative 
layer.”); see generally Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 899 (2009).
Teaching the Torture Memos
94	 Journal of Legal Education
that they can make better moral judgments than their clients,68 and that an 
understanding of social and legal norms is sufficient for educating lawyers.69
Norms, however, as “rules and standards that impose limits on acceptable 
behavior,”70 by definition do not address conditions of uncertainty that may call 
for judgment making beyond existing laws and ethics rules. In fact, behavior 
determined by laws, rules, authority, maintaining the social order and doing 
one’s duty is moral development only at Kohlberg Stage 4.71 In raising the 
specter of moral judgment, however, the Carnegie Report specifically notes 
that lawyers may need to make judgments in spaces that lie beyond laws and 
ethics rules.72 This is Kohlberg Stage 6 at which, “Right is defined by the 
decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing 
to logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency.”73
Similarly, Hannah Arendt recommended developing an individual moral 
philosophy because there are times when the Western philosophic traditions 
of studying customs, norms, laws and character would not be sufficient to 
handle extreme times of moral collapse.74 There are times, too, when leaders, 
to whom Aristotle would have one look as models of moral decision making,75 
are not wise and good. For these times, too, lawyers have to develop a way of 
68. Wendel, Moral Judgment, supra note 10, at 1073 (“Other than the clergy, no profession in 
modern society makes the claim to be better at making moral decisions than its clients.”). 
Similarly, William H. Simon suggests a norms approach that promotes “legal merit.” 
William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999), as discussed in 
Crystal, supra note 6, at 1243.
69. See generally Wendel, Moral Judgment, supra note 10, at 1078–1086.
70. Jones, supra note 11, at 546.
71. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
72. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 129. 
73. Kohlberg & Hersh, supra note 44, at 55. Kohlberg continues that the ethical principles at 
Stage 6 are “abstract and ethical (like the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they 
are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal 
principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the 
dignity of human beings as individual persons.” Id. Kohlberg, however, at the time of his 
death had not fully defined the distinctions between Stages 5 and 6. See Rest, supra note 42, 
at 7. 
74. See generally Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Why Arendt Matters (Yale Univ. Press 2006). 
75. As David Luban restates Aristotle, “We know that virtuous actions are good and noble 
because good men say they are. That good men say an action is good is itself a reason 
for believing, or evidence, that that is the case.” Luban, Epistemology, supra note 33, at 
651 (emphasis omitted) (citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1. 8. 1099a20–23); see also 
R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 635, 642 (2006) (noting 
that an Aristotelian-inspired “focus on character” is the preferred way to address ethical 
problems).
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making moral judgments that may be beyond the norms with which Wendel 
suggests all lawyers’ decisions can and should be made.76
3. Teaching Judgment Making Without Reference to Morality
Finally, some writers on teaching judgment to law students suggest that 
judgment can be taught without any reference to morality. Angela Olivia 
Burton, for example, proposes that “good judgment” can be taught in law 
schools by honing a suite of “intelligences,” including “linguistic, categorizing, 
logical-mathematical, narrative, interpersonal, intrapersonal and strategizing” 
intelligences, which are not normally the focus of law teaching.77 However, 
even though she does not advocate instruction in metaphysics, Burton does 
acknowledge that law is inseparable from the “practical, moral and ethical 
concerns inherent in the realities of human conflict situations.”78
Other writers on teaching morality base their concerns on doubts about the 
value of moral judgment making systems, or “heuristics.” Cass Sunstein, who 
considers moral heuristics simplistic “rules of thumb” or “mental short cuts,”79 
acknowledges that heuristics may be beneficial and accurate in some areas, 
but in the area of morality, especially in unusual cases, heuristics can lead to 
moral errors.80 Sunstein’s criticism is based on the work of psychologists who 
de-emphasize the role of moral reasoning in judgment making and, instead, 
theorize the importance of social and cultural influences on moral judgment 
making. This “intuitionist” model states that moral judgment is caused by 
“quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto 
moral reasoning.”81
Despite Sunstein’s doubts about the efficacy of morals education in law 
school, the research suggests that, like it or not, law students learn about the 
moral choices of lawyers through what is said and not said in the classroom. 
76. See Wendel, Moral Judgment, supra note 10 and text accompanying notes 67–70. Wendel 
suggests a moral Chinese wall, of sorts, in which legal norms and ethics rules, which may 
have “analogues in ordinary moral life,” are separated from moral judgments made outside 
the practice: “Of course lawyers remain moral agents even when acting in a professional 
capacity, but their non-legal moral beliefs should not be permitted to influence their 
interpretation and application of legal norms.” Id. at 1074.
77. Burton, supra note 27, at 22. Burton argues that law school pedagogy focuses “almost 
exclusively” on linguistic, categorization and de-contextualized logical reasoning, capacities 
used in the adversarial aspect of lawyers’ work. Id. 
78. Id. at 16.
79. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 13, at 532 (suggesting that heuristics do not perform 
well when applied to unusual situations); see also Sunstein, Moral Framing, supra note 13, at 
1558 (suggesting that moral heuristics “play a pervasive role in moral, political, and legal 
judgments, and they produce serious mistakes”).
80. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 13, at 541–42.
81. Haidt, Emotional Dog, supra note 46, at 817; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral 
Indignation on Law, supra note 43, at 405–06 (describing “new work” in the psychological 
analysis of morality as a “view that emphasizes moral emotions and moral intuitions that are 
not anchored in reasons”) (citations omitted).
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As the Carnegie Report says, “the law school years constitute a powerful moral 
apprenticeship.”82 The observation finds support in the psychology literature, 
which concludes that “dramatic gains in moral judgment development” can 
happen to young adults when they are exposed to “specific classroom and 
non-classroom contexts that are conducive to growth in moral reasoning.”83 
Given the evidence that students are learning about morality during their law 
school years, coupled with the evidence that education designed to “stimulate 
development in moral judgment” can be effective, incorporating lessons in 
moral judgment making into law classes appears likely to be effective.
4. A Reason-Based Approach for Teaching Moral Judgment Making
If morals are being learned in law school despite their absence from official 
course offerings, and if law school-aged students can be taught to develop 
moral judgment, how should law schools teach?84 Schools should focus 
and shape class discussions on judgment making by, first, grounding the 
discussions in accurate knowledge of the law and professional ethics85 and 
then by introducing to the students a law school-appropriate framework for 
discussing moral reasoning.86 From there, instructors can proffer a moral 
philosophy that fits within the framework. Finally, they can model applying 
the proffered philosophy to a situation that requires moral judgment—such 
as that faced by John Yoo. Presenting a moral philosophy in this way does 
82. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 139. Similarly, researchers at the Harvard Business 
School concluded that MBA students are at a “stage of great exploration and are fully able, if 
not at the most able, to reflect on issues of right and wrong, moral absolutism and relativism, 
and moral courage.” Jennifer M. Mitchell & Eric D. Yordy, COVER It: A Comprehensive 
Framework for Guiding Students Through Ethical Dilemmas, 27 J. Legal Stud. Educ. 35, 37 
(2010).
83. Patricia M. King & Matthew J. Mayhew, Moral Judgement [sic] Development in Higher 
Education: Insights From The Defining Issues Test, 31 J. Moral Educ. 247 (2002) (reviewing 
172 studies of college undergraduates and finding that “significant growth in the use of 
post-conventional moral reasoning [as measured by the Defining Issues Test] does occur 
in college, and this growth is not attributable to general maturation” but to specific 
classroom and non-classroom contexts that are conducive to growth in moral reasoning); 
see also Kohlberg & Hersh, supra note 44, at 53 (1977) (“Whether we like it or not schooling 
is a moral enterprise. Values issues abound in the content and process of teaching.”); see 
generally Gabriel Lerner, How Teaching Political and Ethical Theory Could Help Solve Two 
of the Legal Profession’s Biggest Problems, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 781 (2006) (proposing 
to solve the “shortcomings in the legal ethics curriculum” and “unhappiness of lawyers” by 
“systematically teaching political and ethical theory” which would allow the students to 
learn “sophisticated moral judgment”).
84. See Cantrell, supra note 30, at 397–98 (“If practical wisdom is something law students should 
learn, which teaching method works best to instill it?”). Cantrell recommends an ethics 
clinic to teach students “practical wisdom.” Id.
85. As Neiman says, “simple information is never enough,” but it is “always the first place to 
start.” Neiman, supra note 20, at 188.
86. See Singer, supra note 67, at 904 (“students need to be able to make arguments that can 
express and defend claims of rights and justice”).
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not mean imposing the instructor’s moral values on the students.87 Instead, 
it involves introducing the students to the vocabulary of moral reasoning by 
providing them with a framework and demonstrating judgment making using 
a philosophy.
As members of a reason-based profession, legal educators should teach their 
students to develop a sincerely held and reason-based moral philosophy. With 
these two standards framing the discussion (along with knowledge of law and 
professional ethics) students will be able to articulate their moral philosophies 
with the same intellectual rigor with which they defend a client’s position in a 
lawsuit, negotiation or transaction.
Grounding moral philosophy in reason comports with philosophers’ and 
neuroscientists’ descriptions of the human mind. Humans strive to understand 
the world, as western philosophers have articulated, with “sufficient reason.”88 
Sufficient reason incorporates both emotion and logic, acknowledging that 
neither pure logic nor pure emotion drives moral action.89 Current theories 
in neuroscience confirm that morality is founded in reason—that judgments 
come from the different parts of the brain that control logic and emotion.90 A 
reason-based philosophy, therefore, could not be grounded in pure reactive 
emotion, superstition or fanaticism.91 Nor, however, could it be limited to cool, 
calculating rationalism.92 Under a definition that combines logic and emotion, 
87. See Stanley Fish, Conspiracy Theories 101, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2006, available at Factiva, 
Doc. No. NYTF000020060723e27n0007z (arguing that academic freedom “is the freedom 
of academics to study anything they like; the freedom, that is, to subject any body of 
material, however unpromising it might seem, to academic interrogation and analysis” but 
“there should be an absolute restriction on appropriating the scene of teaching for partisan 
political ideals”).
88. See generally Lloyd Strickland, Leibniz Re-Interpreted (Continuum Int’l Publ’g Group 2006); 
Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); 
Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Mme. 
Karl Hillebrand trans., Julius Frauenstädt ed., 1907) (1813) (Open Court Publ. 2003); 
Neiman, supra note 20, at 190–92.
89. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 181 (“In fact, much like contemporary work from philosophy 
to neuroscience, Enlightenment thinkers rejected simplistic psychologies that pitted reason 
against emotion, emphasizing instead that we’re generally moved by both.”).
90. See, e.g., Antonio Damasio, Neuroscience and Ethics: Intersections, 7 Amer. J. Bioethics 3, 6 
(2007) (“[E]thics is human-made yet grounded in a hodgepodge of neural devices connected 
with the origins of emotions.”); Haidt, The New Synthesis, supra note 40 (In parsing out the 
roles of emotion and cognition in moral decision making, Haidt notes that moral judgment 
takes place in those areas of the brain that integrate intuition into decisions and plans.); see 
also Greene & Haidt, supra note 40. 
91. Neiman, supra note 20, at 192. According to Neiman, Enlightenment philosophers’ use 
of reason first began as opposition to authority that had been “inherited or imposed but 
never justified.” Id. at 184. The Enlightenment’s first efforts “were devoted to undermining 
superstition by exposing contradictions in its scripture and using science to give natural 
explanations to things that looked like miracles.” Id. 
92. See, e.g., Neiman, supra note 20, at 180 (describing Kant’s refinement of David Hume’s critique 
of rationalism: “Reasoning cannot, and should not, be a matter of knowing.”); see also Singer, 
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reason looks very much like legal analysis: a blend of hard rules and supple 
policies, customs and principles.93
The second prong of the framework of law school discussions of moral 
reasoning is sincerity—that in addition to being based in reason, the students’ 
approaches to moral judgment making should be sincerely held.94 Sincerity 
is necessary because, as law students introduced to classical rhetoric learn,95 
speakers and writers who espouse ideas that are undercut by their actions are 
not credible.96 As Aristotle notes in his Rhetoric, “We believe fair-minded 
people to a greater extent and more quickly than we do others.”97 Sincerity 
alone, however, is insufficient for moral judgment making, for there are many 
ideas that may be sincerely held, but are not informed by information and 
reason.98 Therefore, any moral philosophy employed in law school discussions 
should first have to withstand challenges to its reason and its proponent’s 
sincerity.
supra note 67, at 906 (recommending that lawyers look beyond economic approaches when 
theorizing a just society and look, instead, to moral and political philosophies that are 
grounded in “practical reason”).
93. See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing and Analysis 55 (Aspen 2007) (describing the 
“forms of legal reasoning” as “rule-based,” “analogical,” “policy-based,” “custom-based,” 
“principle-based,” and “narrative”).
94. See generally Neiman, supra note 20, at 72.
95. First-year legal writing courses often discuss the rhetorical tools of logos (appeals to logic), 
pathos (appeals to emotions), and ethos (appeals based on the character of the speaker). 
See, e.g., Kristen Kinrad Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers: The Theory and 
Practice of Analysis and Persuasion (West 2009); Michael R. Fontham, Michael Vitiello 
& David W. Miller, Persuasive Written and Oral Advocacy in Trial and Appellate Courts 
26–27 (Aspen 2007) (discussing the use of reason and the character of the audience); James 
A. Gardner, Joseph W. Belluck & Laura L. Aswad, Legal Argument: The Structure and 
Language of Effective Advocacy 38, 146 (LexisNexis 2007) (discussing the use of reason 
and a “hook,” or an appeal to emotion); Mary Beth Beazley, A Practical Guide to Appellate 
Advocacy 180 (Aspen 2006) (discussing the advocate’s credibility); Robin Wellford Slocum, 
Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Persuasive Argument 311 (LexisNexis 2006) (discussing the 
advocate’s credibility).
96. As Neiman says, “harmony between words and deeds” is needed to withstand logical assault. 
Neiman, supra note 20, at 72.
97. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, bk. 1, ch. 2 1356[A] (George A. 
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991); see also Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 95, at 203 
(discussing Quintilian’s view of “ethos,” that to be effective, an orator must, among other 
things be a “sincere believer in his cause”) (citing Quintilian, Institution Oratorio, bk. 12, 
ch. 1 ¶¶ 3–10).
98. Neiman also notes that present day observers can be distracted by too much speculating 
on others’ sincerity. Neiman, supra note 20, at 26. Focusing on the theory underlying the 
sincerely held belief is far more important. “[Q]uestions about individual sincerity [. . .] are 
less important than they seem. Cynicism and fanaticism can be equally ruthless.” Id.
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III. Susan Neiman’s Moral Clarity:  
A Reason-Based Approach for Moral Judgment Making.
The judgment-making approach of moral and political philosopher Susan 
Neiman fits within the two-part framework (reason-based, sincerely held) 
proposed above as suitable for a law school-based approach for moral judgment 
making.99 Neiman’s approach is informed by the Western philosophical 
tradition, particularly the Enlightenment philosophers. In making judgments, 
she suggests keeping in mind four principles, which are adapted here for law 
school teaching.
A. Four Principles of Moral Judgment Making 
First, students should be cautioned that making moral judgments is difficult. 
The interplay of law, ethics rules and personal morals involves understanding 
nuances and implications in fact, policy and regulation. As Neiman writes: 
“Moral judgment is not a matter of decisions made once and for all, but of 
keeping your eyes on distinctions. Numbers matter. Gradations matter . . . . 
Moral judgments are slow, specific and seldom absolute.”100 Simplistic one-
size-fits-all dogmas, she says, will not solve difficult moral questions. In this, 
political thinkers across the spectrum101 and legal ethicists102 would seem to 
agree—moral decisions need to be grounded in specific, actual questions.103 
99. Moral and political philosopher Susan Neiman was born in Atlanta, Georgia and educated 
at Harvard. She is currently director of the Einstein Forum in Potsdam in Brandenburg, 
Germany. A student of John Rawls at Harvard, Neiman received her Ph.D. in Philosophy 
in 1986 and has taught at Yale and Tel Aviv Universities. She is the author of, among other 
works, The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford Univ. Press 1994); Evil in Modern 
Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter 
Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought], and Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists, 
supra note 20, as well as numerous articles and book chapters, and is the recipient of a 
number of awards and honors, including a fellowship at the Institute of Advanced Study. 
See Curriculum Vitae, Susan Neiman, available at http://www.susan-neiman.de/docs/cv.html.
100. Neiman, supra note 20, at 3. 
101. See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 671, 692 (2006) (noting that a “typical philosopher’s mistake” is to attempt[ ] 
to derive concrete conclusions from premises that are too general or abstract to cut between 
policy choices on the ground”) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Coercive Interrogation]; 
William Bennett, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism 10 (Regnary 
2002), quoted in Neiman, supra note 20, at 424 (“[M]oments of moral clarity are rare in 
life, and they are exceedingly precious. They usually follow upon hours-years of moral 
confusion; they seldom arrive all at once or definitively; and they are never accompanied by 
a lifetime guarantee.”).
102. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 28, at 261–262 (noting that “classical virtue ethics and judgment-
based approaches to legal ethics emphasize the importance of focusing on particularities”); 
Luban & Millemann, supra note 6, at 39 (“Moral decision making involves identifying which 
principle is most important given the particularities of the situation.”).
103. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 34, at 6. 7, 1141b12–14 (“Nor does practical 
wisdom deal only with universals. It must also be familiar with particulars, since it is 
concerned with action and action has to do with particulars.”). 
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Acknowledging this suggests that conversations grounded in supposition 
or hypotheticals are likely to be ineffectual for serious discussions of moral 
judgment making.104
Second, recognize that in the situation requiring moral judgment there likely 
will be a difference between what “ought” to be and what “is.”105 The ability to 
reason, Neiman says, allows humans to imagine places (the “ought”) beyond 
the actual (the “is”).106 However, a mature moral philosophy acknowledges 
that sometimes the choices available only permit distinguishing between levels 
of evil and choosing between or among them.107
The third step of Neiman’s approach is to focus on the character of the 
action, not the character of the actor.108 Since intent is an element in public and 
private law, this step may be difficult for some law students to parse.109 But, as 
Neiman writes, intent is not at the core of acting morally.110 In fact, most evil 
deeds are done by people who do not believe they are motivated by evil.111 
And the reverse is just as true. People who do good deeds tend to discount 
104. See infra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
105. Neiman, supra note 20, at 423. The is/ought distinction is generally first ascribed to David 
Hume:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, 
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning [. . .] when of a 
sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, 
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought 
not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that I 
shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given. 
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469 (Clarendon Press 1896) (1739).
106. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 190–191; see also id. at 192 (“The gap between is and ought is the 
space where questions begin.”).
107. In praising certain aspects of the approach of Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman to U.S. 
foreign policy, Neiman writes, “They [Lieven and Hulsman] are also right to insist on a 
‘capacity to distinguish clearly between different grades of evil, and to choose firmly between 
them.’ We must pick our battles, and cannot do everything at once.” Neiman, supra note 
20, at 73 (citing Anatol Lieven & John Hulsman, Ethical Realism at 112 (Pantheon Books 
2006)).
108. Neiman, supra note 20, at 426–27.
109. For example, criminal law focuses on mens rea, or “criminal intent,” Black’s Law Dictionary 
1075 (9th ed. 2009); some torts look to the tortfeasor’s intent, see generally Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 8A; and some current contract scholarship describes the use of virtue 
jurisprudence to examine parties’ intent in assessing damages in contract actions. See, e.g., 
Chapin Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 Or. L. Rev. 703 (2010). Teasing apart the 
spaces in moral judgment making in which intent should matter—if there are any such spaces 
at all—is an intriguing question beyond the scope of this article. 
110. Neiman, supra note 20, at 426–27.
111. Id.; see also Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind 180 (Harcourt 1978) (“Most evil is done by 
people who never made their minds up to be or do evil at all.”).
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them when their motives are not pure. But, good deeds and bad come from a 
mixture of motives and desires.112
The fourth and final step of Neiman’s moral philosophy, which this article 
proposes as fitting within the frame of law school education, is this: Stand 
ready to call anyone into question.113 If an action does not stand up to sincerely 
felt, reason-based scrutiny, then no matter who is doing it—a family member, 
a teacher, a judge, a well-educated legal scholar or a president—a reason-and 
sincerity-based moral philosophy requires us to call him or her into question.
B. Application of the Four Principles to the Torture Memos
As 9/11, Abu Ghraib and revelations about the role of lawyers in Bush-era 
war policy grow more distant, the law school instructor may have to place the 
Torture Memos into historical context before moving on to a discussion of the 
moral judgment making inherent in their writing. In this section, this article 
briefly recalls some historical context and then addresses the memos using 
Neiman’s moral reasoning.
1. The Torture Memos’ Background and Context: 
A “Condition of Uncertainty.”114
Several dozen legal documents together lay out the authority for the 
George W. Bush Administration’s handling of prisoners captured in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were begun in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks.115 The documents include presidential directives relating to 
112. Neiman, supra note 20, at 427. An unnamed friend of Jay Bybee noted Bybee’s good 
intentions in signing the two Torture Memos, but said it was Bybee’s commitment to a 
certain interpretive theory of the law that led him to sign them:
[A]ny lawyer, when he or she is writing about something very complicated, very 
layered, sometimes you can get it all out there and if you’re not careful, you end up in 
a place you never intended to go. I think for someone like Jay, who’s a formalist and a 
textualist, that’s a particular danger.
 Karl Vick, Amid Outcry on Memo, Signer’s Private Regret; Friends Say Judge Wasn’t 
Proud of Outcome, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 2009, at A1.
113. Neiman, supra note 20, at 429.
114. See the Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 22 (“Making judgments under conditions of 
uncertainty” is a hallmark of the professional.).
115. As subjects of various Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and leaks, the 
memos have been posted in a number of publicly available places and collated and edited 
in others. In 2005, Karen J. Greenberg, then of New York University Law School, and 
Joshua L. Dratel, lead counsel to David Hicks, a detainee at Guantanamo, edited a 
collection of documents. The Torture Papers, supra note 15. The American Civil Liberties 
Union maintains a searchable database of documents turned over to it in its FOIA action 
against the government, available at www.thetorturereport.org. In addition, in its National 
Security Archive, which publishes a range of declassified documents obtained through 
FOIA requests, George Washington University also maintains a searchable database called 
The Torture Archive, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/index.
htm. More recently, John Ehrenberg and others collected and edited documents relating to 
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establishing CIA-run secret prisons;116 advisory opinions from lawyers in the 
Office of Legal Counsel on “extraordinary renditions”;117 the limitations on 
federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from prisoners 
held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba;118 the status of prisoners under the Geneva 
Conventions;119 and the “plenary” authority of the president in matters having 
George W. Bush’s decision to invade and occupy Iraq. John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, 
Jose Ramon Sanchez & Caroleen Marji Sayej, The Iraq Papers (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
116. President Bush’s directive, signed September 17, 2001, remains classified. However, in a 
reply to ACLU’s FOIA request for, among other things, a “Directive signed by President 
Bush that grants CIA the authority to set up detention facilities outside the United States,” 
the CIA acknowledged the existence of a presidential memorandum to the director of the 
CIA. Letter from John L. McPherson, Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence 
Agency to Melanca D. Clark, Nov. 10, 2006, available at www.aclu.org/files/images/torture/
asset_upload_file825_27365.pdf.
117. Id.
118. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo to William J. Haynes, II, 
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held 
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Dec. 28, 2001, available in The Torture Papers, supra note 110, 
at 29. In pertinent part, the memo concludes, “the great weight of legal authority indicates 
that a federal district court could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien 
detained at [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba],” id., but that “[A] detainee could make a non-
frivolous argument” that such jurisdiction does exist. Id. The basis of this conclusion was a 
1950 Supreme Court decision that held that federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear habeas 
petitions filed by an enemy alien who had been seized and held at all relevant times outside 
the territory of the United States. Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). 
Thus, the analysis in the Bush-era memo turned on the extent to which Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba was a “territory of the United States.” Id. 
119. See Memorandum from John Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty to William J. Haynes, II, General 
Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees,” Jan. 9, 2002, available in The Torture Papers, supra note 15, at 38. The Geneva 
Conventions provide, inter alia, for the humane treatment of prisoners taken in conflicts and 
they set forth rules for “competent tribunals” to determine the status of prisoners. Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. This memo garnered very strong objection from certain members of the 
Bush administration. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged the President to 
apply the Geneva standards, noting that since the Geneva Conventions were concluded, the 
U.S. has never denied their applicability even if there could be arguments made that they did 
not technically apply. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President and 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for 
the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 
Jan. 25, 2002, available in The Torture Papers, supra note 110, at 122. General Powell’s 
concerns were echoed by the Memorandum to Counsel to the President from William H. 
Taft, IV, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Conventions, Feb. 2, 2002, available in 
The Torture Papers, supra note 15, at 129. As Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh note, by taking 
away the protections of the Geneva Conventions, a new era of prisoner interrogation began, 
and because of the earlier memo’s conclusions that prisoners held at Guantanamo did not 
have access to habeas corpus review, the prisoners could not object. Jameel Jaffer & Amrit 
Singh, Administration of Torture: A Documentary Record from Washington to Abu Ghraib 
and Beyond 4 (Columbia Univ. Press 2007).
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to do with war, including “capturing, detaining and interrogating members of 
the enemy.”120
Of the dozens of memoranda generated by the OLC, two memos in 
particular are helpful for introducing law students to discussions of moral 
judgment making. The first, “Bybee I,” concludes that acts that do not 
cause a “sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ 
failure, or serious impairment of bodily function,” are not “torture” under the 
federal anti-torture act and thus may be used by government agents during 
interrogations.121 The second memo, “Bybee II,” applies the definition of 
torture developed in Bybee I to ten specific techniques: “(1) attention grasp, (2) 
walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, 
(6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed 
120. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, 
Department of Defense on Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held 
Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/olc-interrogation.pdf. The memo concluded that the president has “plenary control 
over diplomatic relations,” id. at 12; that one of the “core functions of the Commander 
in Chief is that of capturing, detaining, and interrogating members of the enemy.” Id. 
at 6. In a memorandum written in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, Yoo concluded: 
In both the War Powers Resolution and the Joint Resolution, Congress has 
recognized the President’s authority to use force in circumstances such as those 
created by the September 11 incidents. Neither statute, however, can place any limits 
on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military 
force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. 
These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to make. 
 Memorandum from John Yoo to Deputy Counsel to the President on The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nationals 
Supporting Them 19 (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.
htm. By the time Yoo authored the two August 2002 Torture Memos considered here, 
this assertion of sole and omnipotent presidential authority evolved to claims that a 
“core function” of the president’s constitutional authority is “capturing, detaining, and 
interrogating members of the enemy.” Bybee I, supra note 16, at 38; see generally Peter J. Spiro, 
The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, Foreign Affairs, 
Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9; see also Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 21 (“Yoo and I were part of a group 
of conservative intellectuals—dubbed ‘new sovereigntists’ as was the Pentagon’s top lawyer, 
William J. Haynes II.”). 
121. Bybee I, supra note 16. The 50-page Bybee I was written by John Yoo for President Bush’s 
legal counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and is signed by the then head of the Office of Legal 
Counsel, Jay S. Bybee. See Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 142. Bybee I was obtained by the 
Washington Post, which wrote about it on June 8, 2004. Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, 
Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture: Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, Wash. 
Post, June 8, 2004, at A1. This memo was later withdrawn by Jack Goldsmith when he 
replaced Jay Bybee as head of the OLC. A new memo, dated December 30, 2004, replaces it. 
See Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General on Legal Standards Applicable 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004). As John Yoo notes, the withdrawal of the 
first memo and the issuing of the superseding memo happened “just a few days” before 
Alberto Gonzales’s confirmation hearings to become attorney general. Yoo, War By Other 
Means, supra note 3, at 170–71.
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in confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.”122 The memo concludes that 
using the ten techniques on al Qaeda “associate” Abu Zubaydah would not 
violate the anti-torture statute.123
The memos’ contents do little to reveal the historical context in which they 
were written. Yoo, who wrote the memos, which were signed by his boss Jay 
S. Bybee,124 acknowledges that he relied on the CIA for much of the factual 
information he used in reaching his legal conclusions that the ten techniques 
did not amount to torture.125 In reaching his legal conclusions, Yoo also relied 
on the CIA’s description of the techniques, its assurance that the “procedures 
will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to prevent severe mental or 
physical harm,”126 its reports about the long-term effects of the techniques,127 
and its psychological assessment of Zubaydah.128
 Even though the memos do not discuss the wider political and social concerns 
of the time, most American lawyers, law scholars, and law students likely have 
an understanding of the broader context of the memos—a recollection of or 
some reading about the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath—and likely know it as a 
time of great uncertainty, one in which there was limited knowledge and many 
122. Bybee II, supra note 17, at 2. Bybee II is an 18-page legal memo addressed to the acting 
general counsel for the CIA and is signed by Jay Bybee, although it, too, was written by John 
Yoo. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 142. Bybee II was released on April 16, 2009 by the Obama 
Administration in response to the ACLU’s ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation. 
See Press Release, Department of Justice, 4/16/2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2009/April/09ag-356.html. 
123. Bybee II, supra note 17, at 18. “Longtime [Osama bin Laden] ally and “Al Qaeda associate” 
Abu Zubaydah “helped operate a popular terrorist training camp near the border with 
Pakistan.” The 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 3, at 174, 150, 59. He played a “key role” 
“in facilitating travel for Al Qaeda operatives” and in planning various attacks in the U.S. 
Id. at 169, 255. He was “not believed to be directly linked” to the 9/11 attacks; see http://
www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf, but was captured by the 
U.S. and held in a secret CIA prison, questioned by “military personnel,” and then moved 
to Guantanamo. George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions 
to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006). Transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
124. See supra notes 16–17 and 121–122 and accompanying text.
125. The memos reveal that Yoo relied on the CIA representations to him that: The CIA 
interrogation team was “certain” that Zubaydah had “additional information”; the 
techniques would only be applied on an “as-needed basis”; repetition of the techniques would 
not be “substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several 
repetitions.” Bybee II, supra note 17, at 1–2. CIA interrogators waterboarded Abu Zubaydah 
“at least 83 times” in August 2002. In March 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the “self-
described planner” of the 9/11 attacks, was waterboarded 183 times. Scott Shane, 2 Suspects 
Waterboarded 266 Times, N.Y. Times, April 20, 2009. According to the OPR Report, by 
2005 approximately 30 prisoners had been subject to painful interrogation techniques. OPR 
Report, supra note 18, at 245. A third detainee, Al-Nashari, was also waterboarded. Id.
126. Bybee II, supra note 17, at 2. 
127. Id. at 2–7.
128. Id. at 7–9.
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possible outcomes of decisions to be made.129 In a 2006 book discussing the 
immediate post-9/11 time, Yoo describes a government unprepared to handle 
the attacks: The criminal legal system had failed to address terrorism,130 the 
enemies operated in an “unconventional” and “asymmetric” manner,131 and the 
administration had, before the attacks, focused only on “domestic issues,”132 
he says. Similarly, Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee’s successor as the head of OLC, 
noted the constant tension faced by attorneys in the OLC between a “duty 
to define the legal limits of executive power” and “finding a way, if possible, 
to approve presidential actions.”133 These obligations were made even more 
difficult after the 9/11 attacks because the Bush Administration perceived itself 
as facing a new kind of war, one with “no apparent end.”134 Goldsmith also 
describes a Bush White House besieged by “incessant waves of threat reports” 
without any “actionable intelligence” to assess the threats.135
However, these historical conditions were by no means viewed uniformly 
by writers at the time. Some inside the government tried to ban the torture 
of detainees,136 cultural critics warned against overheated rhetoric,137 and 
historians suggested the United States’ checkered record on international 
affairs may have invited the attacks.138
129. The Carnegie Report does not define “conditions of uncertainty,” but it notes that practice in 
the professions necessarily “means involvement in situations that are indeterminate from the 
point of view of formal knowledge.” The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 8. Similarly, the 
business literature defines “uncertainty” as a state of having limited knowledge and in which 
there exists more than one possibility. “The ‘true’ outcome/state/result/value is not known.” 
Douglas W. Hubbard, How To Measure Anything: Finding the Value of Intangibles in 
Business 50 (Wiley 2010).
130. John Yoo, War By Other Means, supra note 3.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 38–39.
134. Id. at 116.
135. Id. at 72–73.
136. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Memo, New Yorker, Feb. 27, 2006 (describing the efforts of Alberto 
J. Moro, general counsel of the U.S. Navy, to ban the torture of detainees).
137. See, e.g., Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America 4 (Metro. 
Books 2007) (quoting President Bush’s statements in his first post 9/11 press conference that 
“We’ll smoke him out” and “Wanted: dead or alive”).
138. See, e.g., Tony Judt, America and the War, N.Y. Review of Books, Nov. 15, 2001, at 4 (quoting 
historian Mary Beard, “however tactfully you dress it up, the United States had it coming”). 
Further reading on the background and context of the Torture Memos might include, in 
addition to the works cited in this article: Don M. Snider, Paul Oh & Kevin Toner, The Army’s 
Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Strategic Study Institute (Army 
War Coll. 2009), available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=895; Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Torture, War, and Capital Punishment: Linkages 
and Missed Connections, in The Road to Abolition: The Future of Capital Punishment in 
the United States (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., NYU Press 2009); Kevin M. 
Carlsmith & Avani Mehta Sood, The Fine Line Between Interrogation and Retribution, 45 
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Given this historical context, this article posits that Yoo made judgments in 
writing the Torture Memos under conditions of uncertainty.139 Yoo had limited 
knowledge of the situation in that much of the critical information about the 
torture techniques and the context in which they would be used came from 
the CIA. Further, he did not know the “true” state of threats; intelligence 
information was unreliable; and he did not consider, at least in the Torture 
Memos, whether there would be any value to intelligence gleaned via torture.140 
Moreover, the possible outcomes—in advising that the ten techniques were not 
torture—were numerous.
2. Applying Neiman’s Approach to the Torture Memos
Once law students are introduced to Neiman’s four principles and the 
background and context of the Torture Memos, the law instructor can use 
the memos to springboard a discussion of judgment making by focusing the 
discussion on the situation faced by John Yoo. This approach to discussing 
J. Exper. Soc. Psych. 191, 195 (2009) (noting that although most Americans cite utilitarian 
motives for supporting torture, in fact “their endorsement of harsh interrogation techniques 
may be fuelled, at least in part, by retributive motives”); Jeannine Bell, One Thousand 
Shades of Gray: The Effectiveness of Torture, Indiana Univ. School of Law-Bloomington 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=820467; 
Office of Inspector General Central Intelligence Agency, Special Review, Counterterrorism 
Detention and Interrogation Activities from September 2001–October 2003 (2004), available 
at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/IG_Report.pdf; Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, 
The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application 
and Enforcement, 14 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (2001).
139. See Hubbard, supra, note 129, and accompanying text; Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 22. 
140. Yoo has since written that the post-9/11 decisions of the Bush administration “have been 
successful in preventing another 9/11-type attack” on the United States. Yoo, War By 
Other Means, supra note 3, at viii. However, claims that the torture of Zubaydah yielded 
actionable information have since been proved wrong. See OPR Report, supra note 18, at 
243–48; Press Release, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein and 
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, CIA’s Coercive Interrogation 
Techniques (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm/2012/4/feinstein-levin-statement-on-cia-s-coercive-interrogation-techniques (reporting 
on a review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program and calling statements by former Bush administration officials 
that torture was effective “misguided and misinformed”). Similarly, writers since at least 
Aristotle’s time have questioned whether any information learned via torture is reliable: 
We may say what is true of torture of every kind alike, that people under its compulsion 
tell lies quite as often as they tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell 
the truth, sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner. 
 1 Aristotle, Rhetoric 39 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1924) (Dover 
Pub. 2004); see also Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison 32–69 
(Alan Sheridan trans. 1977) (Vintage 1995) (discussing the history of torture used in 
interrogations as serving several purposes, but that obtaining the truth was not a primary 
one); Chris Mackey & Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al 
Qaeda 31–32 (Little, Brown & Co. 2004) (noting that military instructors of interrogation 
techniques “hammered home the idea that prisoners being tortured or mentally coerced will 
say anything, absolutely anything, to stop the pain”).
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the memos comports with Neiman’s first principle that judgment making 
should be grounded in specific, actual questions.141 Moral hypotheticals, such 
as popular discussions of torture in the context of the former Fox Television 
series 24142 or ticking time bomb scenarios, reduces real life moral questions 
to “jejune” and “simplistic” examples.143 Grounding a discussion of moral 
judgment making in actual situations—by analyzing the context and the 
writing of the Torture Memos, for instance—provides a more realistic model 
for discussion.
The real life context of the Torture Memos demonstrates the second 
principle, that moral decisions will often present a tension between what ought 
to be and what is.144 The OLC attorneys were asked by their clients145 whether 
they could use ten painful techniques in interrogating Abu Zubaydah. An 
attorney in that position might believe that we “ought” to live in a world where 
disputes are settled without war so treatment of prisoners captured in a war 
never becomes an issue, but that was not the world the OLC inhabited. It was 
not the “is.”146 Attorneys need to reach conclusions.147 Given prisoners captured 
in a war, then, the attorney must address how they should be treated.148 
141. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
142. See Juliette N. Kayyem, The Other Students: Teaching the “War on Terror” to Nonlawyers, 
55 J. Legal Educ. 57, 58, 62 (2005) (Although Prof. Kayyem’s public policy students 
discussed the TV show 24 “every Tuesday,” their class discussion was often grounded by her 
students’ real life experiences in special operations, the military, ambassadorial postings and 
the FBI.). But see Yoo, War By Other Means, supra note 3, at 172 (discussing an episode of 
24).
143. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1440, 1441–43 
(pointing out a fatal fallacy of the ticking time bomb scenario is that it posits that the bomb 
is actual while in any real-life scenario a potential torturer would have no such certitude) 
[hereinafter Luban, Liberalism]; see also Wendel, Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 
10, at 74 (referring to “implausible hypotheticals like the ticking time bomb case”); OPR 
Report, supra note 18, at n.168 (discussing differing points of view of the value of the ticking 
time bomb scenario).
144. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
145. The Torture Memos were addressed to the counsel of the president and the CIA, respectively. 
See supra notes 16–17 and 121–122 and accompanying text. Each entity is permitted to seek 
advice from the OLC. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2010).
146. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 190–194.
147. In teaching law students that they have to state their predictions in legal memoranda 
without “waffling,” eminent legal writing teacher and author Richard K. Neumann, Jr. 
notes, “Historians have spent half a century trying to figure out whether it was necessary 
to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, and they will probably continue arguing about it 
forever. But if the issue were tried in court, the jury would have to decide it now.” Richard 
K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style 90 
(Aspen, 5th ed. 2005). 
148. John Yoo’s approach was to first reject categorizing Abu Zubaydah as a “prisoner of war.” 
See Memorandum from John Yoo to Robert J. Delahunty on Application of Treaties and 
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Jan. 9, 2002, available in The Torture Papers, supra 
note 15, at 38. In this memo, Yoo concludes that the protections of the Geneva Conventions 
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Yoo’s conclusion that the CIA interrogators could use the ten techniques 
drew speculation from commentators across the political spectrum who 
ascribed to him a variety of motives, good and bad. For example, critics 
describe his desire to champion his personal views of the extent of authority of 
the presidency,149 his desire to please his bosses by giving them an “immunizing 
document” so that CIA officers would not be prosecuted,150 and his ambition.151 
But defenders say his motives were good, that his only intent was to “provide[] 
reasonable legal advice and no more.”152 Yoo, too, suggests that his intentions 
were to do good legal work in spite of the difficulty of rendering legal advice 
at that time: “These [new Bush Administration] policies were the result of 
reasonable decisions, made by thoughtful people in good faith, under one of 
the most dire challenges our nation has ever faced, he wrote.153 Speculation 
or assertions about motive, however, are not considered under Neiman’s 
approach. Instead, the focus is on the character of the action, not the character 
do not extend to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. Id. His conclusion had the effect of 
eliminating from consideration thousands of years of history, tradition, domestic law, and 
international treaties addressing prisoners of war. See Gregory P. Noone, et al., Prisoners of 
War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 50 Naval L. Rev. 1, 7 (2004) (noting that 
customs and laws regarding prisoners of war goes back to at least the times of Hammurabi, 
approximately 1750 BCE).
149. See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV to John C. Yoo, Your Draft Memorandum 
of January 9, at 2 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/20020111.pdf (noting Taft’s understanding that Yoo has “long been 
convinced that treaties and customary international law have from time to time been cited 
inappropriately to circumscribe the President’s constitutional authority”). 
150. Clark, supra note 19, at 468. The Office of Professional Responsibility also called this assertion 
into question. It concluded that the Torture Memos had policy concerns at their root, that 
they “were drafted to provide the client with a legal justification for an interrogation program 
that included the use of certain [enhanced interrogation techniques].” OPR Report, supra 
note 18, at 226. 
151. Scott Horton, Quid Pro Quo, Harper’s Magazine online, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://
harpers.org/archive/2010/02/hbc-90006587. “Each [key actor in the drafting of Bybee I and 
Bybee II, including Yoo] sought a specific high office that the recipients of the memos were 
able to give them.” Id. John Yoo “clearly aspired” to become the head of the OLC. Id. 
152. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A “Torture” Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, Wall St. 
Journal, July 6, 2004, at A22; but see Memorandum from David Margolis on Decision 
Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of 
Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of 
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 67 (Jan. 5, 2010), available 
at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20100220JUSTICE/20100220JU
STICE-DAGMargolisMemo.pdf [hereinafter Margolis Memo] (while refusing to adopt 
the OPR’s findings of misconduct against Yoo and Bybee, Associate Deputy Attorney 
General David Margolis did note: “I fear that John Yoo’s loyalty to his own ideology and 
convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his client and led him to author opinions 
that reflected his own extreme, albeit sincerely held, view of executive power while speaking 
for an institutional client.”).
153. Yoo, War by Other Means, supra note 3, at vii. 
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of the actor. Debating whether Yoo is a good man154 or whether his intentions 
were good draws attention away from his actions: A lawyer advised his clients 
that it was lawful for them to use in interrogations ten physical methods, which 
in other places and at other times had been labeled “torture.”155
Although Yoo defends his actions,156 his view of his role is ultimately at odds 
with Neiman’s final principal—stand ready to call anyone into question. Yoo 
154. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 329–30 (“Calling actions evil can be polarizing; so be it. Calling 
people evil is polemical. Worse than that, it presumes a knowledge of the human soul, where 
I have no such right.”).
155. See generally Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy 281 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007). In his 
list of “clean torture” methods (techniques that leave “few marks,” id. at 553), Rejali lists the 
techniques that are considered in Bybee II, including the “attention grab” (which Bybee II 
calls the “attention grasp” and “facial hold”), the “attention slap,” a variety of “positional 
tortures” (Bybee II discusses “cramped confinement,” “wall standing,” “stress positions”), 
and “sleep deprivation.” Id. at 554–56; see Bybee II, supra note 17, at 2. Rejali also describes 
a number of water-based methods of torture, including a 17th-century Dutch-pioneered 
method in which, “Torturers shoved soaked cloth into a prisoner’s mouth, ladling water on 
it until the victim nearly suffocated. They would then remove the cloth for questioning and 
reapply it as needed.” This method closely resembles Yoo’s description of the “waterboard”: 
In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is 
approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. 
A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a 
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and 
mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow 
is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an 
increase in [the] carbon dioxide level in the individual’s blood. This increase in carbon 
dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces 
the perception of “suffocation and incipient panic,” i.e., the perception of drowning. 
 Bybee II, supra note 17, at 3–4; see also OPR Report, supra note 18, at 235–36 (“The [United 
States] government has historically condemned the use of various forms of water torture 
and has punished those who applied it . . . . The general view that waterboarding is torture 
has also been adopted by in the United States judicial system.”). The OPR Report also 
concluded that Bybee II’s conclusions about sleep deprivation and stress positions were not 
“based on a thorough, objective, and candid analysis of the issues,” id. at 236, and that sleep 
deprivation as an interrogation technique was condemned as torture in U.S. jurisprudence. 
Id. at 236–37; International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment 
of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 8–9, 24 (describing methods of “ill-
treatment” and later defining them to be “torture”) (2007), available at http://assets.nybooks.
com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf.
156. Some writers have noted that Yoo violated the lawyer’s ethical obligations of candor 
toward his client. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 468. The Department of Justice’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR) concluded that Yoo had violated the Ethical Standards 
for Attorneys for the Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2003), “based on a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Yoo knowingly failed to provide a thorough, objective, and candid 
interpretation of the law” in authoring Bybee I and indicated its intent to refer its findings 
to the state bar disciplinary authorities. OPR Report, supra note 29, at 251. It made similar 
findings regarding Jay Bybee. Id. at 255. However, David Margolis, the associate deputy 
attorney general in charge of resolving “challenges to negative OPR findings” did not adopt 
the OPR’s findings of professional misconduct and therefore refused to allow OPR to refer 
its findings to state bar disciplinary authorities. Margolis Memo, supra note 152. At least one 
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acknowledges that “critical moral and policy concerns surround interrogation 
policy,”157 but that it was not his role to raise policy, ethical or moral questions.158 
Under Neiman’s fourth precept, lawyers would not be able argue that it was 
not their job to raise moral considerations.
3. Calling Neiman’s Approach Into Question
Once presented with Neiman’s four-step method on making moral 
judgments, students can challenge her approach or test it by applying it to 
different real-life scenarios.159 In either case, they will have the beginnings of a 
moral vocabulary with which to begin to tackle the issues.
In discussing Neiman’s approach, students may, like Cass Sunstein, question 
the validity of heuristics in moral judgment making.160 However, this article 
does not suggest teaching law students simplistic moral rules of thumb.161 To 
the contrary, as Kant suggests, making rules for moral judgments would yield 
a paradox of recursivity, as judgments would always be needed to assess which 
rules to apply.162 Therefore, this article recommends encouraging students to 
develop their own metaphysics. Teachers can also point out that, as lawyers-in-
training, students’ moral framework should be based in reason and sincerely 
held so it can withstand the kind of logical assault all legal arguments must 
be able to meet. Teachers can also offer Neiman’s approach as one method 
of making moral decisions. Ultimately, however, students should challenge 
Neiman’s approach as they develop their own moral decision-making sense.
ethics complaint has been filed against Yoo in Pennsylvania. See Complaint against John 
Choon Yoo, filed by Velvet Underground to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania, May 18, 2009, supplements filed June 10, 2009; both available at http://
velvetrevolution.us/torture_lawyers/index.php.
157. Yoo, War By Other Means, supra note 3, at 173. 
158. Id. at xii (“Sometimes people look to the law as if it were a religion or fully articulated 
ethical code that will make these decisions for us, relieving us of the difficult job of making 
a choice. The law sets the rules of the playing field, but it does not set policy within that 
field.”). In declining to adopt OPR’s recommendations that Yoo and Bybee be referred to 
state bar disciplinary authorities, David Margolis acknowledged that citation to examples 
of water torture “may have provided useful historical context” but that such context “would 
largely relate to the policy decision rather than to the legal question,” and therefore was not 
required under the applicable rules of conduct. Margolis Memo, supra note 152, at 61.
159. See Singer, supra note 67, at 902 (“If we are thoughtful, we are aware of objections that can be 
made to our own claims.”).
160. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. On his discussion of heuristics, Sunstein 
has his detractors. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Moral Heuristics: Rigid Rules or Flexible 
Inputs in Moral Deliberation?, 28 Behav. & Brain Sci. 544 (2005) (suggesting that reflection 
accompanies moral intuition to render correct moral judgments). 
161. See Young-Bruehl, supra note 74, at n.43 (noting Arendt’s concern that her Ideal Types 
would be used as “formulas for making propaganda” rather than as “criteria for guiding 
judgment”).
162. See Kant, supra note 33.
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To some critics, Neiman’s approach may not withstand logical assault. That 
is, there may be logical vulnerabilities to a philosophical approach that asserts, 
for example, “Look at the character of the action rather than the character 
of the actor.”163 A virtue ethicist, who focuses on intent and the character of 
the actor, likely would challenge this approach.164 In response, an instructor 
may point out that judgment making that relies on Aristotle’s notion that “we 
know that virtuous actions are good and noble because good men say they 
are”165 begs for a cautionary note such as that raised by Hannah Arendt in the 
aftermath of the Nazi and Stalin eras: “We—at least the older ones among us—
have witnessed the total collapse of all established moral standards in public 
and private life.”166 Although students may look to heroes for inspiration,167 
moral judgment making stands ready to call anyone into question.168
In contrast to the virtue ethicists, a deontologist might argue that using 
Neiman’s approach to consider the Torture Memos—in its lack of an absolute 
prohibition against torture at the outset, for example—focuses too much 
on consequences.169 A deontological approach to considering the moral 
163. See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text. 
164. See generally Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Virtue Ethics,” available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue; see also Cimino, supra note 109 (“A person who makes a 
good decision out of a mere duty has not exhibited virtue.”); Chapin F. Cimino, Review 
Essay: Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 279, 
286 (2010) (“[T]he ‘right’ thing is defined by the right choice by the right person at the right 
time.”).
165. Luban, Epistemology, supra note 33, at 651.
166. Hannah Arendt, Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, in Responsibility and Judgment 
(Jerome Kohn ed., 2009) (1966); see also Robert N. Johnson, Virtue and Right, 113 Ethics 
810, 810 (2003) (“[T]he claim that right actions are those of a virtuous person is so far from 
being an uninteresting truism as to be utterly false.”). Aristotle’s vision of a student learning 
ethics at the seat of “good men” may have had its place in “centuries past,” when learning 
in the professions happened in an apprenticeship designed to expose the apprentice “to 
the full dimensions of professional life, not only the intricacies of esoteric knowledge and 
peculiar skills, but also the values and outlook shared by physicians, lawyers or ministers.” 
The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 79. However, law students, apart perhaps from well-
designed co-op experiences, do not learn that way today. By contrast, today’s law students 
learn the intellectual, practical and ethical skills of being a lawyer separately. Id.
167. Neiman, for example, champions the Old Testament Abraham as a hero of moral reason, 
for he was willing to call God into question over His planned destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 1–4, 10. Kierkegaard and Kant dismiss Abraham as 
one who has left reason behind because, in another Old Testament story, Abraham plans to 
sacrifice his son Isaac. Id. at 10; see Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Alastair Hannay, 
trans., Penguin 1995) (1843); Immanuel Kant, the Conflict of the Faculties 115 (Mary J. 
Gregor, trans., Abaris 1992) (1798).
168. Neiman, supra note 20, at 429.
169. See generally Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Deontological Ethics, available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue. A deontological approach is a “rule-based system 
in which situation contexts are deemphasized. In this theory, ethics is conceptualized mostly 
as a series of rules or obligations; choices are ‘right’ if they are done in accordance with 
these rules.” William E. Hudson, Note: The Ethical Spy: Towards Intelligence Community 
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judgments involved in writing the Torture Memos could encompass a bright-
line prohibition against torture. But as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
argue, “this position is held by very few moral philosophers, if any,” and 
that to apply such a rule-based approach at the outset of a torture debate 
is “fanatical.”170 While neither of these comments would likely suffice in a 
reason-based discussion, they do illuminate the importance of articulating 
one’s position with clarity rather than resorting to labels or name-calling, as 
there are writers who categorize Neiman’s philosophical forbearer Kant as a 
deontologist because of his formulation of the categorical imperative.171
Finally, a consequentialist’s172 examination of the Torture Memos might 
note, among many consequences, that the memos enabled those responsible to 
evade responsibility;173 that they led to the suffering and humiliation of human 
beings;174 that they permitted representatives of our government to conflate 
investigation with punishment; 175 and that they caused the United States 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 98 Geo. L. J. 1415, 1419 (2010). For an argument rejecting 
the deontological objections to torture, see Posner & Vermeule, Coercive Interrogation, supra 
note 101, at 676–78.
170. Posner & Vermeule, Coercive Interrogation, supra note 101, at 676. In fact, Posner and 
Vermeule suggest that a moral heuristic that states “never inflict pain on a defenseless 
person” fails in the face of the issue of coercive interrogation because “inflicting pain on 
the defenseless through coercive interrogation saves real lives.” Id. at 705–06. Among the 
problems with this argument, however, is that those who have been trained in and studied 
coercive interrogation conclude that torture is ineffective in garnering truthful information. 
See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
171. The categorical imperative, “Do unto others as you would be done by,” is a “formal version” 
of the Golden Rule. Neiman, supra note 20, at 201, 202, which some writers see as a rule. See, 
e.g., Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in 
the Wake of September 11, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 2013, 2031–32 (2003) (framing the issue of whether 
torture is ever justified as one pitting “Kantian deontologists” against consequentialists); 
Cassidy, supra note 71, at 640–41 (“Deontologists such as Immanuel Kant posit that we must 
look to prior principles in order to decide upon a moral course of action.”). The better 
analysis is that the categorical imperative is an “abstract and ethical” guideline, rather 
than a concrete rule. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Child as a Moral Philosopher, Psychology 
Today, Sept. 1968, at 24. Similarly, Neiman, who defends Kant’s theory of the “categorical 
imperative,” see Neiman, supra note 20, at 202–14, rejects categorizing Kant as a deontologist. 
“Reason works not by rules, but by principles.” Id. at 204. 
172. Consequentialism looks at whether an act is right only in terms of the consequences of 
the act. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Consequentialism, available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism.
173. John Yoo and Jay Bybee were absolved of ethical violations. See generally Margolis Memo, 
supra note 152. 
174. See Neiman, supra note 20, at 354 (In discussing the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison by 
members of the U.S. Army and other government agents, Neiman notes Israeli philosopher 
Avishai Margalit’s belief that humiliation is something “decent societies must avoid” 
because it “rejects human beings as human.”).
175. See Foucault, supra note 140, at 40–41 (noting that torture in interrogations is not aimed at 
obtaining the truth, but at obtaining a confession and imposing punishment during the pre-
trial investigative period when a sense of the prisoner’s guilt begins to mount); see also David 
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negative effects at home and abroad.176 Yoo, however, suggests a different 
perspective on consequences: that his actions helped prevent another attack 
on the United States.177 These considerable differences in perspective on the 
consequences of the Torture Memos point to “how many consequences are 
determined by chance”178 and suggests that focusing on consequences may 
sidetrack the more important question of the nature of the action itself.
Ultimately, a focus on philosophical categories is of little help if the goal is 
to encourage law students to add moral reasoning to their analysis of legal and 
ethical questions. To achieve this goal, it may be more profitable to employ 
any moral heuristic as a jumping-off point for discussion, keeping in mind the 
fundamental requirements of a law-school based moral education—reason and 
sincerity.179
V. Conclusion
Legal educators should encourage their students to develop a moral 
vocabulary and a reason-based approach to moral judgment making to frame 
and discuss issues of moral philosophy that may arise in the classroom or in 
their later practice. As the Carnegie Report concludes, “[H]igher education 
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in The Torture Debate in America 
(Karen Greenberg ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) at 35–83, 42 (an expanded version of 
Luban, Liberalism, supra note 143) (noting the five aims of torture—“victor’s pleasure, terror 
[in the sense of scaring people into submission], punishment and extracting confessions” 
and as a “technique for intelligence-gathering from captives who will not talk”).
176. See, e.g., Mehdi Hasan, Comment: A Bonfire of U.S. Vanities: Nine Years After 9/11 the “War 
on Terror” Still Rages, Guardian, Sept. 11, 2010, at 28 (“The ‘war on terror’ has resulted 
only in more war and more terror.”); David K. Rebhein, Photos That Could Cost Lives, 
Wall St. J., May 8, 2009, at A11 (quoting Sen. Kit Bond, “I don’t think there’s any question 
[the release of Abu Ghraib photos] will endanger all of us, because I think it will enhance 
recruitment for all kinds of terrorists willing to come after us.”); Justine Sharrock, Am I a 
Torturer?, Mother Jones, Mar. 1, 2008, at 42 (“Foreign-policy scholars fear the fallout from 
Abu Ghraib has already weakened the U.S. military’s anti-terrorism capabilities.).
177. See Yoo, War By Other Means, supra note 3, at 172 (“So far we have prevented another 
successful attack on the United States.”). This conclusion, however, has been called into 
doubt by the OPR Report, which concluded that CIA assertions about the effectiveness 
of enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate. OPR Report, supra note 26, at 
245–46 (questioning whether the OLC should have relied on CIA representations about 
effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques given that the CIAs representations 
“provided inaccurate information”).
178. Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, supra note 99, at 89.
179. See supra notes 84–98 and accompanying text. In deference to institutional strictures or 
student sensibilities, some legal educators may be reluctant to define reason in a way that 
eschews religious revelation or other non-reason based philosophies. In most instances, 
however, religious restrictions should not prevent incorporating a reason-based approach 
to moral questions, because, as Neiman notes, most of the major religions have reason-
based traditions that permit thoughtful inquiry beyond rules and commandments. Neiman, 
supra note 20, at 10–11. These reason-based traditions may invite inspiration and advice from 
sources outside human reason, but none of these traditions dictate an ideology or dogma 
that offers perfect moral judgments all the time. Id. at 424.
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can promote the development of more mature moral thinking” and that, 
“for better or for worse,” the “law school years constitute a powerful moral 
apprenticeship.”180
There is ample evidence from philosophers, psychologists and 
neuroscientists that law students can be taught to become more thoughtful, 
more reason-based and more nuanced in their moral reasoning. Because law 
students are learning about making moral decisions, law faculty ought to 
address this aspect of professionalism directly by giving students a framework 
to discuss making judgments. The framework would acknowledge that 
judgments need to be well-grounded in law and rules of legal ethics but also 
that they need to be informed by a moral metaphysics that is sincerely held 
and reason based.
One such philosophy is that of moral and political philosopher Susan 
Neiman, whose approach looks at moral questions on the level of the 
particular and actual, rather than attempting to set grand-scale rules based on 
hypotheticals. She also notes that judgment making often requires choosing 
the lesser or least among evils, of accepting that what “ought” to be must 
sometimes give way to what “is.” Neiman’s approach focuses on the character 
of the action rather than the character of the actor and it advocates for each 
person taking responsibility for challenging the judgments of others, no 
matter what their status or position. In this way, Neiman’s method differs from 
that of legal educators who focus on virtue ethics and moral norms. Neiman’s 
method, this article suggests, is helpful for considering the conclusions of the 
Torture Memos, especially to the extent it draws attention to the character 
of the actions permitted by the memos—actions that have historically been 
considered “torture.”
180. The Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 139.
